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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this case, the defendant claims that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel and therefore his 
conviction should be overturned. 
At trial during the states case in chief, Monica 
Lawson was allowed to testify as to alleged statements made 
by defendants brother. Defendant's brother was not called 
by the state as a witness but was later called by counsel 
for the defendant. The defendant's counsel did not object 
to the hearsay statement. Failure to object was error by 
counsel for the defendant and the admission of the hearsay 
testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The decision by counsel for the defendant to call 
Davey Montes, the brother of the defendant, as a witness was 
made upon the basis of inadequate preparation. If counsel 
for the defendant had determined the expected testimony of 
the state's witnesses, then Davey Montes would not have been 
called as a witness. His testimony was cumulative to his 
father and sister and by calling him as a witness, counsel 
for the defendant allowed hearsay statements allegedly made 
by Davey to be admitted into evidence in the form or oral 
testimony by Jeanna Hackford. The testimony was used 
substantively in the state's case. 
Counsel for the defendant should have objected to 
the rebuttal testimony of Jeanna Hackford on the basis that 
the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. The possibility of prejudice in 
1 
such a case is inordinately high and the reliability of the 
statement requires a resolution of a swearing contest. 
The court should consider defendant's claims as 
submitted by affidavit. The court should review all claims 
of error asserted by the defendant in this appeal. To do so 
will conserve judicial time and resources. 
DATED this ci jS day of August, 1990. 
~ fil D. Berrett 
torney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 2*-3 day of August, 
1990, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT, to R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, by depositing 
the same, postage prepaid, in the United States Post Office, 
Roosevelt, UT 84066. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
THOMAS D. MONTES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890336-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW the appellant, Thomas D. Montes, (Montes) 
and respectfully submits this Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 
24 (c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the direct examination of Tom Jones, he 
testified that the blue Samurai was parked by the alley that 
goes behind Sathers. Tr. p. 60. On cross examination, he 
testified that the car was probably twenty (20) yards or so 
down the street. Tr. p. 64. The state in its brieff 
asserted that the car was parked in front of Satherfs 
Jewelry Store. There appears to be no testimony on the 
record that the Samurai was parked in front of Satherfs 
Jewelry. 
ARGUMENTS 
THE TESTIMONY OF MONICA LAWSON ABOUT HER 
CONVERSATION WITH THE BROTHER OF MONTES 
AT SCHOOL THE DAY FOLLOWING THE ROBBERY 
OF SATHERfS WAS HEARSAY AND COUNSEL FOR 
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MONTES ERRED BY NOT OBJECTING TO IT. 
Monica Lawson was the third witness called by the 
state in this case. At the time Monica Lawson was called as 
a witness, Davey Montes had not been called as a witness and 
counsel for Montes was not required to call Davey Montes as 
a witness. Her statements about her conversation with Davey 
Montes were hearsay and should have been objected to and 
excluded by the court. State v Colonna , 766 P.2d 1062 
(Utah 1988). Gaines v. Thieret , 846 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
In Gaines , the defendantf s brother made an out 
of court statement implicating defendant in a murder. At 
trial, over defense counsel's objection, the court allowed 
testimony that the defendant's brother had indicated that 
the defendant had shot and killed two people. The appellate 
court overruled the conviction because the hearsay evidence 
had been admitted stating that the court could not agree 
that admission of the hearsay testimony was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
The state argues that what objections to make are 
generally left to the professional judgment of counsel, and 
the court will not second guess the strategy of counsel at 
trial and that a decision not to object falls within the 
reach of trial strategy. If the state's argument were 
followed to its logical conclusion, then if counsel for any 
defendant made no objections to the introduction of evidence 
which should be excluded at trial, that decision would be 
2 
trial strategy and beyond the review of an appellate court. 
The cases cited by the state regarding objections refer to a 
closure order, State v. Butterfield , 784 P.2d 153 (Utah 
1989) and a jury instruction. State v Medina , 738 P.2d 
1021 (Utah 1987) not to objectionable testimony. 
In State v. Charboneau , 774 P.2d 299 (Idaho 
1989), Judge Bistline, in a dissenting opinion stated, 
Unsuccessful but reasonable tactical 
decisions should not be the basis for 
finding ineffective assistance of counsel, 
but only so long as the strategic choices 
have some plausible basis in the record. 
...When counsel's trial strategy decisions 
are made upon the basis of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the applicable 
law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluati ^ the defendant may 
very well have been denied effective 
assistance of counsel. 
The reasoning of Judge Bistline is applicable in 
the instant case. Counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations. Informed legal choices can be made only 
after investigation of options. State v. Crestani , 771 P. 
2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989). In the instant case, if counsel 
for Montes had properly investigated the case, it is 
unlikely that he would have called Davey Montes as a 
witness. Daveyfs testimony was cumulative to his father and 
sister and confirmed that Montes had returned home about 
10:30 p.m. on the night in question. The state asserts that 
by calling Davey as a witness, Montes opened the way for the 
alleged statements of Davey to be used substantively in the 
state's case. 
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Montes is aware of the statement in State v. Wood, 
648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981) that "decisions as to what witnesses 
to call...are generally left to the professional judgment of 
counsel". However, in this case the decision to call Davey 
Montes as a witness was made upon the basis of inadequate 
preparation. The decision to call Davey as a witness denied 
Montes of effective assistance of counsel. 
II 
AN OBJECTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE REBUTTAL 
TESTIMONY OF JEANNA HACKPORD THAT IT'S PROBATIVE 
VALUE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY THE DANGER 
OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE. 
The state argues that there is no factual support 
for the assertion by Montes that the probative value of the 
testimony of Jeanna Hackford was outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. The argument of Montes is based on the 
fact that testimony used to impeach Davey Montes was also 
used as evidence against Montes. Even though the court has 
wide discretion in determining whether the statement was 
admissible or inadmissible, it was error for trial counsel 
for Montes in failing to object to the testimony and 
requiring the court to exercise its discretion. The 
evidence was damaging to Montes and should have been 
excluded. 
Rule 801 (d)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence in 
effect at the time State v. Cruz , 627 P.2d 689 (Ariz. 
1981) was decided is idential to the present Utah Rule of 
Evidence 801 (d)(1) except the Arizona Rule does not contain 
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the phrase "or the witness denies having made the statement 
or has forgotten." The court in Cruz , acknowledged that 
impeachment evidence could be used substantively but held 
the trial court had erred in admitting the impeachment 
testimony because the "possibility of prejudice is 
inordinately high and the reliability of the statement 
requires a resolution of a swearing contest." The court 
further noted that the statement was especially prejudicial 
due to the fact that if believed by jury it established 
appellant's guilt. 
Ill 
THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS 
AS SUBMITTED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
The state asserts that the matters submitted by 
Montes in affidavits should not be considered by the court. 
The Affidavits allege that trial counsel for Montes failed 
to bring before the court information suggesting that jurors 
had discussed the prior record of Montes during a trial 
recess and that Montes had been taken past the jurors in 
handcuffs and shackles. 
The fact that trial counsel for Montes did not 
bring these matters to the attention of the trial court is 
part of the record as there is nothing in the trial 
transcript relating to jury conversations during a recess at 
trial or whether Montes was seen by the jury while in 
handcuffs and shackles. Communications between a defendant 
and his attorney are not normally part of the record. The 
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Supreme Court of this state has held to the view that any 
claims of error or impropriety should be asserted in the 
regular procedure provided for on appeals. Martinez v. 
Smith , 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 1979). The court should consider 
all claims of Montes as advanced in his briefs. 4 Am. Jur. 
2d Appeal and Error Section 540. 
CONCLUSION 
Montes urges the court to find that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel at his trial and to reverse 
the decision previously rendered in this matter and remand 
for a new trial. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
JOEL D. BERRETT 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Rule 801 RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY 
Rule 801. Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declar-
ant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if— 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and 
the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, or (B) consistent with 
his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against 
him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of 
identification of a perc n made after perceiving him; or 
(2) Admission by party-, yvonent. The statement is offered against a 
party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or 
belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make 
a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, 
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a 
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
Comment 
Evidence which is admissible under the hearsay rules may be inadmissible 
under some other rule or principle. A notable example is the confrontation 
clause of the Constitution as applied to criminal cases. The definition of 
"hearsay" is a utilitarian one. The exceptions to the hearsay rule are based 
upon considerations of reliability, need, and experience. Like all other rules 
which favor the admission of evidence, the exceptions to the hearsay rule are 
counterbalanced by Rules 102 and 403. 
Rule 801(d). This subsection of the rule has been modified and is consist-
ent with the United States Supreme Court's version of the Rule and State v. 
Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135, 515 P.2d 880 (1973). 
Historical Note 
Source: 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801, (mod-
ified). 
Cross References 
Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness, see Rule 613. 
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nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or 
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) 
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influ-
ence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving him; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual 
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has mani-
fested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a 
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the sub-
ject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection 
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay 
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices 
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of 
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially 
the same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). 
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from 
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior 
statements as substantive evidence if (1) incon-
sistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and 
does not require the prior statement to have 
been given under oath or subject to perjury. 
The former Utah rules admitted such state-
ments as an exception to the hearsay rule. See 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with 
respect to confrontation problems under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally pro-
mulgated by the United States Supreme Court 
with the addition of the language "or the wit-
ness denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior 
Utah rule and the actual effect on most juries. 
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the 
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its 
interpretation of the applicable rule in this 
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 
310 P.2d 388 (1957). 
Subdivision (d)(1)(C) comports with prior 
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123, 
388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 
2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 (1969). 
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was 
contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
Similar provisions to subdivisions (d)(2)(B) 
and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to 
the hearsay rule. 
Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), 
was of similar substance and scope to subdivi-
sion (d)(2)(D), except that Rule 63(9) required 
that the declarant be unavailable before such 
admissions are received. Adoptive and vicari-
ous admissions have been recognized as admis-
sible in criminal as well as civil cases. State v. 
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
Statements by a co-conspirator of a party 
made during the course and in furtherance of 
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